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C/276
Defence of Givenchy
9-17 April 1918

The account that follows was composed by David Spiby and edited by RFAWestLancs.  It gives an overview of the battle with a particular focus on the action involving C/276 and the courageous conduct of 687335 Sgt William Spiby (David’s great uncle), for which he was awarded the DCM.

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Chris Baker of The Long, Long Trail writes:

The Defence of Givenchy was to become the single most famous action that 55th Division fought. “It was afterwards publicly stated by an officer of the German General Staff that the stand made by the Division on April 9th and the days which followed marked the final ruination of the supreme German effort of 1918”, says the Divisional history. Givenchy was eventually selected as the location of a fine memorial to the Division (see below).

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For full details of this action, see Chris Baker, The Battle for Flanders: German Defeat on the Lys, 1918, and Phil Tomaselli’s battlefield guide Battleground Europe: Givenchy and the River Lawe.

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Givenchy summary

After a preliminary artillery bombardment that began on the evening of 7 April the German Sixth Army, spearheaded by storm troops, attacked in force early on the morning of the 9th. Heavy mist enabled the attackers to get very close to the Allied lines before they were observed and Portuguese units suffered heavy casualties and began to retire. Further south, the various formations of the 55th Division were hard pressed from the outset and the front line trenches around Givenchy were the scene of fierce fighting between British and German troops. The divisional brigade holding the northern section of the British line was forced to pull back, but well-organised counter-attacks and determined defence elsewhere enabled the 55th Division to hold its ground for the rest of the battle and prevent a major German breakthrough. Fighting continued in the trenches east of Gorre until 17 April when the German forces finally broke off the attack. In just over a week of fighting almost 3,000 officers and men of the Division had been killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, but the territory over which they had fought remained in Allied hands.

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276 Brigade, Royal Field Artillery

battery locations 9 April.png

As at 7.15pm 9 April.  Battery locations (blue squares on the left hand side of the map) and  SOS fire targets (red ovals on the right hand side of the map).

The War Diary reads:

 

9th April

4.15am Enemy opened heavy H.E. and Gas bombardment on all Battery areas, Headquarters, and Wagon Lines.  Batteries opened on “Counter preparation” and later on S.O.S.  Hostile infantry reported attacking, and pressing back our Infantry on the Left.  164th Infantry Brigade still holding GIVENCHY.  Continuous hostile shelling throughout the day.  Enemy infantry at one time reached forward gun of A/276 Battery in GUNNER SIDING, but counter-attacked and driven off.

6.42pm A/276 Bty report all guns destroyed and personnel manning trench in front of position.  Ordered to move personnel to Wagon lines with all material that can be salved.  D/276 Battery moved forward gun back to main position.  Throughout the day information received of enemy concentration.  Batteries opened fire on all occasions, and with the exception of local encounters no further attack on a large scale developed on Group Front.

8.00pm  Information received that 800 prisoners captured to date.

10 April 1918 7.30am FESTUBERT heavily shelled and enemy attacking in neighbourhood of LOISNE.  (The enemy attack continued throughout the day but by) 8.30pm Infantry report enemy attack driven off.  All Batteries ceased fire on S.O.S. lines but continued harassing fire at slow rate.

 

Men killed in 276Bde:

680149 Whl/Cpl Walter Stephen Ward, 9 April 1918

681755 Sgt Frank Thomas, 10 April 1918

680681 Dvr John Thompson, 10 April 1918

241964 Gnr John Thomas Dolphin, 10 April 1918

 

What strikes one about these reports is the remarkable degree of fire control the RFA and 276 Brigade were able to bring including close liaison with both the Heavy Artillery and Infantry on the ground in a very fast changing environment. Having read many other similar reports this does seem remarkable.

In several instances the enemy had approached to within 200 yards of guns in action. In some cases these were pulled out of their pits and used point blank, doing fine execution. In other cases the battery rifles and Lewis Guns were called into play, and took equally satisfactory toll of the enemy. In no single instance did the enemy get into a battery position. An anti-tank gun of the 276th Brigade, in the open on Givenchy Hill and within 500 yards of the front line, though surrounded and damaged by enemy fire, continued firing at point blank range through­out the action. Several six inch trench mortars in the same locality, after firing until the enemy was on top of them, also used their rifles with great effect. As a result no guns or trench mortars were lost.

Note: an anti-tank gun is not a different type of gun but is referring to a standard 18pdr which has been moved to just behind the front lines to apply direct line of site fire against any enemy tank that might appear.

Givenchy.png

Chris Baker, in The Battle for Flanders: German Defeat on the Lys 1918, says that some got across the Givenchy-Cuinchy road and as far as Gunner Siding trench, where a single 18-pounder gun fired 150 rounds at the attackers at no more than 200 yards' range, despite being so badly damaged that the breech had to be opened with a pickaxe. But the rear posts and counter-attack platoons held on, striking back as instructed and gradually pushing the enemy back. The artillery of 55 Division, assisted by fire coming across the canal from 1 Division, fired on the German support lines and reserve trenches, cutting off any possibility of reinforcement; according to later reports from British prisoners, this fire caused severe casualties among the reserve units moving up.

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From other documents it appears the Germans temporarily took “Gunner Siding South” before being dislodged – but never took “Gunner Siding North”.  I am now convinced that these reports are all describing the same event at Gunner siding (Givenchy Hill) and not the action in which William Spiby won his DCM on the same day.

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Where was William Spiby when he won his DCM?  Gorre or Givenchy or Windy Corner?

 

His Citation reads:

687335 Sjt. W. Spiby, R.F.A. (Preston)

C/276 Battery R.F.A.  (2nd West Lancs Bde R.F.A. T.F.)

Date of recommendation: 14/04/18

Award recommended: Distinguished Conduct Medal

“For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty near GORRE on 9th April 1918.

This N.C.O. was acting as Sergeant Major at the gun position.

At 4.15 a.m. on the 9th April 1918 and throughout the day the enemy put down a very heavy barrage near the TUNING FORK (F.4.b.) two guns being put out of action by direct hits and finally the Battery Position came under heavy rifle fire from the enemy, only 100 yards away on the left flank.

Throughout the day this N.C.O. was indefatigable in his efforts to keep his guns in action. With absolute disregard for his own personal safety he went from gun to gun and by his coolness and splendid example, encouraged all ranks to further efforts.

He was finally wounded but refused to leave his guns and remained with them and took charge of the operation of moving the only gun still in action to a new position on the night of the 9th April.”

 

A recommendation was also made in regard to Sergeant Arthur MUNRO, originally for DCM though this was later downgarded to MM.

680346 Sergeant Arthur MUNRO

C/276 Battery R.F.A. (2nd West Lancs Bde R.F.A. T.F.)

Date of recommendation: 14/04/18

Award recommended: Distinguished Conduct Medal

“For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty near GORRE on 9th April 1918 during the attack on the 55th Division.

This N.C.O. was a linesman and, at 4.15 a.m. on the 9th April 1918 the enemy put down a very heavy barrage of shells of all calibre with H.E. and gas on the Battery Position near TUNING FORK (F.4.b.)

By 5.00 a. m. all telephone communication had been cut and this N.C.O. immediately went out through a continuously heavy barrage to repair the lines.

Throughout the day he was indefatigable in his efforts to maintain communication working the whole time under heavy shell fire/ he displayed the utmost gallantry and disregard for his own personal safety and his gallant action was of immense value in maintaining communication at a critical period of the battle.

This N.C.O. was awarded the Belgian Croix de Guerre in January 1918 for gallant conduct.

His name was not recommended for reward in the King’s Birthday Honours Gazette.”

 

Note Gorre: is a hamlet 2.5 kilometres north of Beuvry, and 4 kilometres east of Béthune. Leave Beuvry on the D72, crossing the railway and then the Canal d'Aire on the way.  It is the location of  Gorre British And Indian Cemetery.  The Cemetery is 150 metres from the church in Gorre, to the left of the D72 (Rue de Festubert).  Many of those who now lie in plots V and VI of the British section of the cemetery were killed during the Battle of Estaires in April 1918. There are now over 930 Commonwealth servicemen of the First World War buried or commemorated here.

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So did these events happen at North Tuning Fork Defences, Givenchy or Windy Corner?

While the Medal citation reads “Gorre and Tuning Fork” – it can’t be this exact location as the enemy never reached within 1 km of either Gorre or Tuning Fork.  Instead I believe the actual location for William Spiby’s DCM is either at one of three possible locations:

  1. Northern end of Tuning Fork Defences

  2. Givenchy Town in Gunners Siding (which we have already mentioned and dismissed – see above)

  3. Windy Corner – Near Givenchy

We also need to remember that C Battery was split into 2 locations:

  1. F.4.a.65.00 – halfway between Gorre and Tuning Fork

  2. A.7.d.7.1- Windy Corner (note single figures so this means A.7.d.70.10.)

 

  1. Northern end of Tuning Fork Defences

Just north of Tuning Fork Road at Tuning Fork defences, near Loisne just to the north. See map below.

tuning fork.png

This would make a lot of sense as it was here throughout 9 April that there was hand to hand fighting. The Tuning Fork defences would make a sensible place to locate a battery of guns. In addition this location was very close to the battalion HQ in Loisne chateau. However we have the key issue that we have been given the position of the C battery at Tuning Fork and the German advance didn’t get within 2km of this location on the 9th.

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2.  Givenchy Hill/ Gunner Siding

Givenchy “Hill”. On the trench map below you can see Gunner Siding trench in the centre/ bottom of each running just behind the North South Givenchy-Cuinchy road. In addition the name “Gunner Siding” clearly shows what the trench was used for.

However I don’t believe it’s Givenchy Hill/ Gunner Siding as this is where the one anti-tank gun from A battery was positioned.

windy corner.png

Map shows events of 9 April at Windy Corner and Givenchy. German attacks (red arrows) occur in the morning while British responses (blue arrows) generally occur PM.

3.  Windy Corner

I believe the actual position of the forward section of C/276 is just west of Windy Corner as shown on the map right.

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From the Divisional History by Rev J. O. Coop:

“On the extreme left of the 164th Infantry Brigade the enemy had broken through to Le Plantin South; had penetrated beyond the Pont Fixe—Festubert Road at the point of junction with the 165th Brigade; had occupied some houses at Windy Corner, and had even succeeded in pushing a patrol or two as far as Lone Farm.”

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Counter measures were immediately taken and the situation was soon restored. The tenac­ity of the garrisons who held on—though in many places surrounded—and pinned the enemy to the ground, prevented the attack from being further developed, and local counter-attacks, conducted with splendid initiative and energy by Company, Platoon and Section Commanders on the spot, soon resulted in the re-capture of all the ground occupied, together with a large number of prisoners and machine guns. By the early afternoon the situation on the front of this Brigade had been completely restored and the Brigade held all its original line, with the excep­tion of a few of the forward posts and saps. These were re-occupied about dusk without great opposition, and at the end of the day this Brigade held every inch of its original ground.”

windy corner 2.png

This is the  German plan of attack on the day and it focuses on Windy Corner. The green arrows show the planned German advance.

From the captured German map showing their plan of attack on 9 April, it shows the ground immediately west of Windy Corner and what looks like 2 gun emplacements next to the cross in a circle.  I believe this is the location of a section of C battery 276 Brigade.

This ties perfectly with six additional pieces of evidence:

  1. It’s the exact location they were sent to in the brigade orders issued 31st March A.7.d.7.1

  2. The German plan of attack shown in Green arrows matches all the details

  3. The Medal Citation of William Spiby says the German infantry were within 100 yards.

  4. The British battle reports on the 9th for Windy Corner with their intense fights.

  5. This battery is at a road junction- perfect for both repositioning and resupply

  6. The entry in the divisional RFA artillery war diary for the 55th Division reads: "A forward section of C/276 Battery also proved valuable and was able to engage the enemy at short ranges near WINDY CORNER.  One gun was destroyed by shell fire early in the action but the other gun was retained in the forward position."

From this we see it’s the forward section of C battery, and that it’s at Windy Corner. It also states that it engaged the enemy at short range – meaning over open sights. I regard this as conclusive.

So how do we explain the reference in the citation to TUNING FORK (F.4.b.)? I think is completely understandable. C battery was split in two, with one part at Tuning Fork and the other advanced forward to Windy Corner. So the report simply mentions the first point that the Battery were sent to before one section was advanced.

We also have the map below from Chris Baker (The Battle for Flanders) showing the Germans initially breaking through at Windy Corner.

Givenchy German map.png

The battle continues

10th April

At 7-40 on the morning of the 10th the enemy fiercely resumed his attacks upon Loisne, advancing in large numbers from the north under an extremely heavy barrage. A company of the 1/5th South Lancs, was thereupon sent to reinforce Loisne Central, and severe fighting took place. Our men, however, refused to give ground, and after many attempts to penetrate our line, and having suffered very heavy casualties, the enemy was beaten off at 9-30, A heavy attack was also made upon" B” company of the 1/5th King’s Own about 8-20 a.m. at Le Touret, and was strongly pressed. This attack was accompanied by a bombardment of the whole front of the 166th Brigade and of the back areas. The attempt, however, failed, and once again heavy casualties were sustained by the enemy. Determined, however, to break through our defensive flank, yet another attack—as fierce as its predecessor—was launched at 1 p.m. against “ B ’’ company 1/5 th King's Own, and this time succeeded in compelling the company to withdraw a distance of 200 yards. This withdrawal only took place after a very gallant fight, in which the company lost 100 men out of a total strength of 140, and a counter-attack by the 1/5th King’s Own at 2-20 p.m. completely restored the situation and drove the enemy back to his own line. In the early afternoon a strong battalion—the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers—was placed under the orders of the 166th Brigade, and the defence of this flank was believed to be secure; which, indeed, proved to be the case.

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Baffled in his attempts to force us back at Le Touret, the enemy, at 7 o’clock in the evening, launched a second violent attack upon our battered positions at Loisne, and so severely was the attack pressed that he succeeded in gaining a temporary footing in our line. His success, how­ever, was short lived, and he was hurled back once more to his own lines, this time leaving 21 prisoners and two machine guns in our hands. We were not further disturbed that night.

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It was obvious, however, that the enemy must make yet a further attempt to break the ser­ried line which threatened seriously to discount his successes further north, and which baffled his hopes of becoming master of Bethune and of the rich coal mining district surrounding it. Great importance, manifestly, attached to the possession of Bethune, and it was known that the enemy meant to have it at any cost. He did not get it; but, it must be admitted, he tried his best for it.

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At 7 o’clock on the evening of the 10th the Major-General ordered the 165th Infantry Brigade to move their Headquarters from Loisne Chateau to the Ferme du Roi, near Bethune, and this was done next morning. Meantime, the Village Line was subjected to a terrific bom­bardment with shells of heavy calibre, and the defences were practically obliterated by the bombardment. All posts were, however, held intact, and all were ready to hold on still, whatever happened.

The overall position in this sector can be seen in the map right. This shows the change from 9-10 April – but Givenchy remains unchanged.

German advance April 1918.png

11th April

At daybreak on the 11th the shelling of our front, support and reserve lines was resumed, and the back areas again came in for attention. This shelling grew into a bombardment shortly before 8 o’clock and continued with great intensity until 11 o’clock, when an attack was launched from Loisne to the Lawe Canal, and the centre and left of the 166th Infantry Brigade were slightly pressed back. For a time a distinctly dangerous gap was made in our line, but a spirited counter attack by the 1/4th South Lancs, from Mesplaux Farm, and the 1st Northum­berland Fusiliers from Les Facons, restored the situation at a critical moment and the danger passed.

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In the early afternoon the enemy was reported to be advancing in great strength between Rue Cailloux and Quinque Rue, and was, moreover, reported to be massing all along the old British line. The artillery were promptly informed and were turned on to this concentration, in­flicting such heavy casualties upon the enemy that the attack upon the southern portion of the front of the 165 th Infantry Brigade was never able to develop. More to the north, however, the attack was pressed home, and, after a stiff fight, and with heavy losses, the enemy succeeded in capturing Festubert East and Cailloux Keep shortly after 4 p.m. Counter-attacks were immedi­ately ordered and Festubert East was re-captured without much difficulty. A stiffer resistance was expected from Cailloux and two counter-attacks were prepared against it—the first to be delivered by troops in the Festubert locality, and, in case of failure, a second, on a considerably larger scale, by troops from the Brigade Reserve. The first attack, however, did not fail, and by 7 30 p.m. Cailloux Keep was in our possession once more and the whole of the line completely restored.

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In the course of the night of April 11th certain reliefs and re-arrangements took place on the 16 5th Infantry Brigade front, and arrangements were made for the artillery of the 164th Infantry Brigade to register on Route A Keep the following day. The re-capture of this Keep was of immense importance and would considerably strengthen our left flank. It was decided, therefore, that an attempt should be made at midnight on the 12th, and trench mortars were sent up during the day and also registered on the Keep. The attack was entrusted to a company of the Liverpool Scottish and a company of the 13th Liverpools, and promptly at midnight these troops advanced under the artillery and trench mortar barrage, and after a stiff fight— for the Germans, as well as ourselves, realised the importance of the position, and were deter­mined to retain it at any cost—we captured the Keep. A strong counter-attack at dawn next morning was repulsed. A further attack at 5-30 in the afternoon was launched against the Keep, and very severe fighting again took place for its possession. But we were determined to hold what we had won, and though we suffered heavy casualties the end of the fight saw the Keep still in our possession, and it remained in our possession during the rest of our tenure of the line until our relief.

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After the re-capture of Route A Keep no further German attacks of serious importance were attempted. Our lines, cross roads, bridges, and back areas were kept under heavy shell fire, and our troops were kept continuously upon the alert. But the line remained firm, and on April 14th the relief of the Division commenced. The 166th Infantry Brigade was relieved on the night of the 14th/15th, the 165th Infantry Brigade on the 15th/16th, and the 164th Infantry Brigade on the 16th/17th; the artillery remained in the line; the rest of the Division went back to the Auchel area. The line held by the 55th Division now passed to the 1st and 3rd Divisions, the for­mer taking over the right and centre of our old front and the latter the left.

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So ended the battle of Givenchy—Festubert. It had been in many ways a replica of the battle for Épehy on the 30 November 1917. Once again we had been called upon to fight with our flank in the air; once again it had been ours to throw out and maintain a thin defensive flank against an enemy flushed with success and in almost overwhelming force; once again we were placed in a position where to give ground meant the possible sacrifice of the whole front, with consequences of almost catastrophic calamity—and once again we held on. The portion of the line held by the Division from February to September, 1918, was the only section of the whole Allied front, which, being attacked in force, during the great German offensive, was held to the end inviolate. And it was afterwards publicly stated by an Officer of the German General Staff that the stand made by the Division on April 9th and the days which followed marked the final ruination of the supreme German effort of 1918.

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As a result of the operation our captures amounted to nearly 1,000 prisoners and 70 machineguns. Our casualties were necessarily heavy, and amounted to 163 Officers and 2,956 other ranks, killed, wounded and missing. That the enemy's casualties were enormous we have good reason to know—we passed through his cemeteries during our advance in October and we saw for ourselves.

55 Div memorial.jpg

55th Division Memorial

Givenchy

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